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In this presentation I will try to approach the questions of utopia, otherness, 
and what liberation and redemption could possibly mean, from the perspec-
tive of fantasy. Fantasy necessarily seems to inspire terms like utopia and oth-
erness as horizons for the idea of emancipation, but it also infects them with 
the haunting suspicion that they are merely fictional. There will be no utopia 
without fantasy, but fantasy is also the reason why utopia remains simply uto-
pia and cannot be realised. However, this does not entail that utopia cannot 
become reality altogether. Something seems to happen in the moment of its 
realisation that turns utopia traumatic. You might object that not every utopia 
ends up in trauma, and you would certainly be right; nevertheless, it is not ar-
bitrary that utopia so easily collapses into trauma. At least there seems to be an 
intrinsic relationality at play between utopia and trauma, and the task will be 
to understand this relationality, and how it relates in turn to fantasy and reality. 
What becomes visible here is a symbolic matrix linking utopia and trauma on 
its vertical axis, and fantasy and reality on its horizontal axis. I will suggest 
that we should locate all claims to embody or understand emancipation within 
this matrix. It is the symbolic matrix of emancipation.
To address emancipation from the viewpoint of the symbolic already implies an 
understanding of politics that is neither purely phantasmatic nor strictly real-
istic, neither strictly revolutionary nor purely reformist. Politics itself appears 
here as a symbolic category, for concepts like emancipation are just certain fac-
ets of politics: a value or ideal we try to ascribe to our political ambitions and 
actions. However, ambitions and actions rarely meet their goal, and the funda-
mental desire motivating them never does – as we learn from psychoanalysis. 
Any volition deviates on its way into practice, and yet there is no way of think-
ing political subjectivity outside of volition. If voluntarism represents a limit to 
any political ambition, it certainly also works as its condition. Without an idea 
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of subjectivity that is to some extent naïve with respect to the impact and the 
consequences of one’s voluntary actions, no political practice will be possible.1 
The difference between regulative ideas of emancipation and politics, between 
subjectivity and collectivity, on the one hand, and concrete forms of practice on 
the other, is decisive here. There is no direct connection or identity between the-
ory and practice, between ideas and their incarnation. Rather, this difference 
between ideas/ideals and acts/practices is constitutive of the symbolic under-
standing of politics. Voluntary acts directed towards ideas or ideals – existen-
tial ideals like autonomy, authenticity, and sovereignty, communal ideals like 
equality, justice, and solidarity – have to be performed within a socially sym-
bolic space. In this respect, utopia indicates the final achievement of at least 
one of these ideals, and trauma its complete loss. Utopia is a fundamental fan-
tasy inseparable from the ideal of emancipation and politics, subjectivity, and 
collectivity, and even trauma or pure negativity necessarily contain an aspect 
of fantasy that has to be adjusted towards another idea/ideal: that of reality. 
Every single act is not only trapped within that symbolic matrix, it also gener-
ates this matrix first of all by means of its differentiation and “dynamicisation”. 
Neither ideas nor practices alone can be considered to be political. Single acts 
are symbolically determined as political only in and through the relations that 
structure them. Not only the relation of ideas to practices, but also the relation 
to other ideas and practices define both the condition and limitation of political 
practice. However, this structural ambivalence should not be considered the 
universal condition of power relations as such, as is the case with Foucault and 
Butler; it rather indicates the conditions of power under certain very specific 
historical circumstances.
These historical circumstances are defined by the fact that there is no instance 
of absolute decision – no God, Emperor, nor Party – that could decide on the 
1 Not even a purely aestheticised gesture, an “acte gratuit”, could succeed in this respect, 
because its transgressive, non-voluntary effect must still be wanted – or the famous, 
psychotic “passage à l’acte”, which seemingly transgresses all symbolic boundaries, can 
achieve a state of politics beyond volition. Because in order to be understood in any po-
litical sense, it has to be interpreted as such, thus realising at least its implicit message 
or meaningfulness. 
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achievement of these acts.2 These acts remain categorically imaginary, perspec-
tival, and competitive. Any claim, e.g. to universal equality, remains constitu-
tively unequal, a competitive speech act situated against other, similar claims. 
And any radical gesture shares to some minimal degree the symbolic, institu-
tional, and mediated space of its emergence (e.g. as a lecture or a publication). 
As a typically modern symbolic formation, politics cannot synchronise content 
and form; their difference enables the symbolic space of politics. Political acts 
therefore do not realise the idea or the universal ideal they strive for; rather, the 
act brings about something else, a particular kind of event that escapes such 
intentionality. Volition seems to slip constitutively from its imaginary aims into 
reality despite its best intentions, slipping into the reality of the symbolic – a 
kind of Heideggerian Gestell – which seems to inspire yet another imaginary 
act of its own overcoming, which in turn must be repeated over and over again. 
The paradox of political voluntarism lies in the fact that as voluntarism it has 
to imagine some sort of result emerging from its competitive actions; actions 
and practices, however, count as political if and only if they transcend these 
results. Without the promise of transcendence, politics would just be a question 
of the correct administrative commitment to following a certain idea, and that 
is precisely not what politics is about. Politics is never only a means; it always 
also represents ends. Thus, political practices are defined precisely by the lack 
of any voluntary, controllable, and stabilised meaning. The symbolic matrix of 
emancipation and/or politics altogether indicates the absence or non-existence 
of any pre-given normative order, what one might call the big Other. Politics is 
the symbolic space of that absence or non-existence of unity, stability, and con-
trol. Or at least, politics is one of the symbolic formations articulating that ab-
sence/non-existence in addition to culture, science, economy, technology, art, 
and even religion under the conditions of modernity (i.e. at least since the 17th 
century). Although I do not support one-dimensional secularisation theories, I 
would prefer the term “absence” compared to non-existence. It does not seem 
to be the categorical non-existence of a cosmological myth that serves to found 
any social order, but rather the absence of an inclusive, integrational narrative: 
a function which supposedly had been fulfilled by magic, myth, and religion 
in previous eras. The absence of an integrational narrative seems indeed to be 
2 At least no instance was able to establish itself definitely within the last 500 years of Euro-
pean or even world history.
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constitutive of the modern symbolic. Its differentiation into quasi-autonomous 
fields is the very indicator of that absence. And yet, they can only be understood 
in their mutual connection, because science and religion, technology and art, 
politics and economy differentiate themselves in and through acts of mutual 
and complementary reference.3 
In addition to the specific kind of autonomy generated by the fundamental het-
eronomy of the fields, there is also the claim to hegemony that each field raises 
against the others. Their claims to autonomy and to hegemony derive from their 
attempt to positively represent the big Other. That means that otherness is al-
ways implicitly at play within the modern symbolic. For example, science can be 
understood as a symbolic formation or matrix making it possible to understand 
aspects of the world beyond everyday empirical experience. In a similar way, 
politics performs the symbolic function allowing one to imagine a world beyond 
the existing normative order, and the possible realisation of utopian ideals, or 
the overcoming of one’s own existential and social conditions or privileges. And 
art is a symbolic formation that enables a glance into the unknown, unseen, and 
even unexpected. Obviously, these symbolic determinations are highly ideologi-
cal. Hence – if the modern symbolic formations do not only indicate the absence 
of the big Other, but also represent it as being absent – otherness is implicitly 
always at play within these formations. This direction towards otherness – we 
might call it an immanent transgression or even transcendence – is intrinsic 
to modern symbolic forms: a transgression, however, that does not lead to the 
open horizon beyond the scope of the modern symbolic, but rather represents 
that scope and continuously expands its reach. There is no fundamental trans-
gression but only continuous displacement between the fields.4 
This intrinsic and immanent transgression of the modern symbolic indicates a 
sort of order that precisely does not work as a strict law defining specific rules 
that one has to follow or obey. It rather institutes the imaginary in order to break 
the rules and to articulate alternative rules. Given the absence of a one, uni-
3 Art, e.g., is precisely what science is not, but in order to find out about that difference they 
have to have some kind of exchange going on, an exchange that is frequently misunder-
stood as a dissolution of the difference in the name of some trans-category.
4 This categorical displacement of transgressive rhetorics in contemporary activist and ar-
tistic discourse was the starting point of my project “Phantasm and Politics”, which I or-
ganised for the theatre “Hebbel am Ufer”, Berlin, 2013–2015.
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versal law for all, every claim towards such universality can be criticised and 
questioned from other perspectives. Interpellation here does not subject us to 
the law, but to the production of alternative rules. Thus, the agonistic struggle 
for such rules between claim and critique defines the horizontal axis of any sym-
bolic matrix, comparable to fantasy and reality, and which is always related to 
the more antagonistic one between positivity and negativity on the vertical axis. 
Within such matrices, agonism and antagonism do not define fundamental op-
positions; they rather refer to each other, generating the symbolic matrix pre-
cisely through their mutual referentiality. Thus, the space of the symbolic does 
not merely sketch out or map the social space of individual acts; in obstructing 
the realisation of a true autonomy or hegemony of any single claim, it implicitly 
always invites and asks for more acts or practices. The symbolic operates on 
implicit alternatives, always instigating new ones. Hence, we are not suffering 
from a lack of alternatives – that there is supposedly no alternative – but from 
an abundance of alternatives. The symbolic frames our actions and volitions 
always already as alternatives. Paradoxically, the whole symbolic order thus of-
ten appears to be without an alternative. However, misunderstood as personal 
freedom or as the possibility of a meaningful life, alternatives do not resist the 
existing order but express it. Misrepresenting their own conditions, the search 
for alternatives keeps us trapped within the narcissistic and competitive aspects 
of the imaginary. 
Within such a theoretical framework, neither politics nor emancipation can be 
conceived in terms of pure negativity. Politics does not indicate a fundamental 
rupture or break in relation to the established order or master discourse, since it 
always also represents that order or discourse. There is an intrinsic positivity at 
play within every negativity, which is the condition of the symbolic. The existing 
orders and master discourse should most certainly be questioned and under the 
right conditions even political voluntarism and organisational power can over-
throw existing normativities, replacing them with new ones. This is clearly the 
case. However, all such attempts remain within the boundaries of the modern 
symbolic, as I defined it, which frames these attempts and makes them appear 
desirable. Reformism and radicalism, agonism and antagonism, affirmation 
and negation; all these only represent the different options within the symbolic 
matrices of the modern world. To struggle between these options defines poli-
tics, and political struggle will always be necessary to aspire to another world, 
to more social justice, gender equality, a non-racist and non-hetero-normative 
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world; but obviously politics is not enough, if what is at stake is the symbolic 
as such, because as a historically specific symbolic matrix, politics is already 
part of that symbolic order, and thus, in order to think otherwise or other things, 
it might be necessary to look beyond the realm of the symbolic formation of 
politics and search indeed for an “immanent way out,” as Jelica Sumic phrased 
it.5 The problem, however, is not only that the terminological polarities of in-
side and outside, fantasy and reality, positivity and negativity clearly operate 
already within the modern symbolic, but that the desire itself to find a way out 
is part of that same structure. It institutes itself in and through its attempt to find 
a way out. As an “immanent way”, it has to be rooted within these distinctions, 
but as “a way out” it would have to be directed towards a state of affairs precise-
ly beyond such distinctions, towards something not merely outside or other, but 
towards something other than other, or better stated: towards something be-
yond the distinction of inside and outside, sameness and otherness. This might 
indeed be a zone of in-distinction or a zone in which the distinctions open up 
towards new, maybe less polarised multiplicities, or even to a new symbolic. I 
will, however, not speculate on that here. That is none of my business. And I 
am not even sure if such a new symbolic would be desirable. A world beyond 
the specific symbolic formations of modernity – politics, art, culture, science, 
technology, media, and theory – does not sound very appealing to me. And I 
neither have a desire to fantasise a new integrational narrative, fabulating some 
supposed myth beyond myth, a new religion, nor would I like to avoid falling 
prey to my own private, doctrinal fantasy. 
So, obviously, I cannot offer you a way out. I can only sketch out the dimensions 
of the problem, indicating why politics and voluntarism do not suffice, but are 
nevertheless indispensable. This is the case not only because politics is part of 
the struggle for a better life, but also because this struggle is part of the effort 
to understand its intrinsic potentials and limitations. To grasp the symbolic di-
mensions of politics and voluntarism alike is crucial for any understanding of 
emancipation, enlightenment, and radical politics, and in order to challenge 
their intrinsic limitations and contradictions. Since enlightenment implies a 
certain en-darkening, some sort of trauma, or at least a crucial dependency 
5 Jelica Sumic, “Politics and Psychoanalysis in Times of the Inexistent Other”, in: Samo 
Tomsic, Andreja Zevnik (eds.), Jacques Lacan, Between Psychoanalysis and Politics, Rout-
ledge, London, New York 2016, pp. 28–42.
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inside utopia and some implicit conformity within radicalism.6 Therefore, em-
phasising the symbolic dimension of politics does not mean neglecting its real 
dimension, or preferring a moderate version of politics. My point is rather that 
politics can only be symbolically radical and this binds radicality to its reform-
ist or consensual alternative. A radical immanent way out would therefore ask 
again for a state of affairs beyond the difference of radicalism and reformism – 
and thus would no longer be simply radical. But there is doubtlessly something 
to be done before we reach such a state, because its precondition – in order to 
not simply fantasise reality and/or radicalism – would be to differentiate utopia 
from trauma, fantasy from reality, and radicalism from reformism. Not to over-
come, “sublate”, or abolish such dichotomies, but to sharpen their differences 
and possible relations on the grounds of their historical, social, and cultural 
implementations and realisations. This clearly can only happen as a work with-
in the symbolic and leads back to the question of the kind of subject that would 
be capable of achieving this state of reflexion and integrity within its political 
voluntarism. 
Methodologically, as preconditions for such a reconstruction of the conditions 
and relations of political voluntarism – as it appears necessarily within any idea 
of emancipation, enlightenment, or radical politics – I would suggest two es-
sential concepts. Firstly, a post-Lacanian understanding of the symbolic order, 
and secondly, a post-Kleinian conception of the relation between phantasy7 and 
reality as being fundamental to any understanding of subjectivities and col-
lectivities. Post-Lacanian in this perspective means: unlinking the symbolic – 
Lacan’s great innovation – from a direct relation between structural anthro-
pology, linguistics, and the psyche. This is necessary in order to open up the 
diachronic or historical dimension of the symbolic. This historical dimension, 
however, is crucial to understanding the specificities of the modern symbolic, 
how it can instigate otherness by means of permanent change, improvement, 
reform, and revolution. Therefore, we have to relate the category of the sym-
bolic order to the main sociological theories of modernity or modernisation as 
field or system theories. It is here that we gain an understanding of the specific 
symbolic formations of the modern world. However, these theories do not un-
6 That is why I am not so interested in how radical one can be, but more in the way one 
would perform conformity within the proclaimed radicalism.
7 Klein writes phantasy with a ph. From now on I will refer to her term.
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derstand their own categories as symbolic. There are indeed the fields of poli-
tics, art, science, law, culture, psychology, or economy, but they are organised 
neither by pure internal relationality nor by strict functional differentiation. 
They are rather shaped by symbolic mobilisation through continuous acts of 
differentiation and “dynamicisation” by means of mutual, complementary op-
erations, thus realising more and more subfields, which increasingly become 
semi-autonomous fields themselves. Thus, the diachronic does not oppose the 
synchronicity of the structures of the symbolic order; it rather defines these 
structures in a specifically modern way. In this sense, there is no clear distinc-
tion between the social and historical, on the one hand, and the symbolic, on 
the other. The social and the historical are clearly part of the modern symbol-
ic. In a certain sense, history and society even define the meta-structures or 
meta-fields of the modern world, within which the specific fields of science, 
politics, art, culture, law, economy, technology, media and even theory might 
establish themselves. The single fields are always organised around a singu-
larised, generalised, and highly substantialised term: such as art, politics, sci-
ence or culture8; and the practices in these fields try to enact and to perform 
the identity assigned by their respective term. However, incapable of integrat-
ing their identities, and slipping from their idealised goals, they generate the 
symbolic matrices by structuring the crucial oppositions in each field, like the 
opposition between utopia and trauma, fantasy and reality, in the case of the 
subfield of emancipation within the wider field of politics. Thus they create spe-
cific contents for the terms art, politics, or culture, showing as such specific 
historical and cultural imprints; in the case of utopia and trauma, for example, 
their opposition can be clearly localised within the tradition of the messianic 
and/or apocalyptic thinking of the Judeo-Christian world. In this tradition, re-
demption and damnation appear as strictly related to a decisive event; reality 
as we experience it in everyday life is nothing other than a sheer deceit, and 
subjectivity is constructed through acts of belief and not through knowledge 
or feeling. Hence, their universalism is always already historically and cultur-
ally specific, a particular kind of universalism. One cannot sever utopia from 
trauma, because the decision on their relational difference is not ours to make.9
8 My theoretical approach is essentially motivated by an attempt to understand the function 
of these terms and the problem they indicate that we cannot get rid of.
9 I think it is precisely this aspect, which should be reflected more clearly within the after-
math of that tradition in contemporary political philosophy. Especially in terms of the 
model of Pascal’s wager: that there is nothing to be lost but everything to be won seems 
FV_03_2017.indd   86 14. 01. 18   14:47
87
traumatic or utopian other?
The most fundamental question, however, in relation to this specific “histor-
icist” view of the symbolic is whether there is an underlying principle that 
generates and directs these symbolic operations in terms of differentiation 
and “dynamicisation”. Is there something we could consider to be real and 
not symbolic, or even “real” in the Lacanian sense? History – in the Marxian 
understanding of “real history as a mere sequence of class struggles” – and 
capital have frequently been appealed to in this regard. With respect to his-
tory, I think, it is relatively easy to show that it is precisely its symbolic form 
as a “sign of the modern” (Nicolas B. Dirks) that allows for its conception of 
a universal principle, but a more historicist and symbolic perspective seems 
possible for capital as well. This is the case not only because any claim as to the 
“real”, as important as it is as a theoretical category, becomes imaginary in its 
act of enunciation and thereby inscribes itself into the symbolic, but also, more 
concretely, if we refer to the argument of the British Marxist historians Robert 
Brenner and Ellen Wood, the specificity of capital relations can only by grasped 
within agrarian capitalism, which only developed in the 17th century. This ar-
gument clearly indicates that capital relations are effects of and not reasons for 
the modern symbolic order.
For this reason, I do not see any way to overcome, outdo, or bypass the sym-
bolic; it rather seems to constitute the condition for the very understanding of 
any practice and any theory as being political. The last question of my pres-
entation concerns how voluntarism here comes into play. A post-Kleinian per-
spective understands voluntarism as a way of not only articulating politics 
within the symbolic order, but perhaps also hints at the politics of that order 
itself. Within the history of psychoanalysis, Melanie Klein, her school, and the 
whole post-Kleinian field represent a very specific and genuine position, and 
that means more than a mere “fleshing out” between Freud and Lacan, as Jac-
queline Rose phrased it in her essays on a “Return to Melanie Klein” from the 
early 1990s.10 These specificities mainly concern three aspects: phantasy as the 
to be especially problematic: because obviously a lot of being might be lost, especially in 
such case the utopian bet turns into trauma. 
10 Jacqueline Rose, Why War? – Psychoanalysis, Politics and the Return to Melanie Klein, 
Blackwell, Oxford (UK), Cambridge (MA) 1993.
FV_03_2017.indd   87 14. 01. 18   14:47
88
helmut draxler
crucial term of the whole concept, a very particular understanding of the Ego, 
and finally, a special emphasis on forms of collectivity, essentially the group.11 
The Kleinian concept of “unconscious phantasy” is almost identical to the un-
conscious itself. As such, phantasy becomes a fundamental concept, which 
distinguishes it clearly from the Freudian fantasy, which concerns mainly the 
wishful thinking of children, poets, and neurotics, as well as from the Lacanian 
fantasme understood as a strictly defensive screen protecting one from the real. 
Kleinian phantasies are immediately productive and are not necessarily related 
to any lack (one can thus see the attraction of the concept for Deleuze and Guat-
tari). However, something seems to happen between different phantasies: espe-
cially with the transition from the direct alteration of love and hate phantasies, 
typical of the paranoid-schizoid position, to phantasies of grief, guilt, and an 
overwhelming sadness at the beginning of the depressive position. With grief, 
guilt, and sadness aspects of retrospection and reflexion emerge. The Ego of the 
depressive position is still clearly a phantasy – a phantasy, however, trying to 
integrate its split inner and outer objects, to reflect its own orally-sadistic im-
pulses, and the destructive, ruinous effects they generated, and finally to repair 
or compensate for these effects. Obviously, there is no stable identity waiting at 
the end of this process; further splitting is lurking everywhere, and the phanta-
sies of integration, reflexivity, and reparation might even be implemented only 
by further acts of splitting. 
Hence, the Kleinian Ego, as it shows up in the depressive position, is neither a 
pure pleasure Ego nor a mere reality Ego; it can neither be understood as auton-
omous nor as completely decentred. As an essentially depressed Ego, it learns 
to distinguish inside and outside, projection from introjection, partial object 
and total object/person, but only at the price of grief, guilt, and sadness. Phan-
tasy here is not just limited by some outer reality – a reality principle; it rather 
produces all too many realities, which seemingly collapse within the essential 
psychotic core of our psychological existence. However, the Ego recognises dif-
ferent phantasies, it opens a marginal space between them, and thus learns to 
distinguish the sheer categories of phantasy and reality – a phantasy-phantasy 
11 For a discussion of the political dimension of Kleinian thought, see: Eli Zaretzky, “Melanie 
Klein and the emergence of modern personal life”, in: John Phillips, Lindsey Stonebridge 
(eds.), Reading Melanie Klein, Routledge, London, New York 1998, pp. 32–50.
FV_03_2017.indd   88 14. 01. 18   14:47
89
traumatic or utopian other?
and a reality-phantasy. Thus, the Ego is not a complete illusion and its reality 
is not a total deceit. But at the same time, it is not much more.12 Precisely be-
cause reality is essentially phantasmatic, it cannot be recognised as such by 
pure thought. Reality has to be felt by the Ego in order to distinguish its more 
or less phantasized moments. It is the “Ego feeling”, to allude to Paul Federn’s 
discussion in 1925,13 in and through which phantasy and reflexion can be sep-
arated from each other, a separation that makes possible a reality that is not 
merely a phantasy.
Thus, this Ego has to be phantasized, but it does not represent a mere phantasy. 
But neither does it constitute a purely reflexive, rational instance; it has to be 
essentially felt. Finally and most importantly, the Ego’s reality cannot be its 
own possession. There is no way that reality is just my reality – if that were the 
case, it would be a total phantasy. Through moments of projection and introjec-
tion and the exchange of inner objects in various object relations, the Kleinian 
Ego is thoroughly social. That is why neither liberal individualism nor radical 
collectivism, neither strict particularism nor unconditional universalism, ad-
equately characterise the options here. It is rather the group as a specifically 
social entity in and through which individualism and collectivism, particular-
ism, and universalism find themselves mediated. In Wilfred Bion’s concept of 
group analysis this approach has even found a clinical form. And I would sug-
gest, to explore its political implications, it is the group and not the master who 
is the political agent here.
Within this scenario the subject of politics cannot be understood as being com-
pletely de-centred, de-individualised, and de-psychologised. It remains essen-
tially psychological, but at the same time socially and culturally mediated in 
many ways. The group does not transcend or erase individuality; it remains 
dependent on its deliberate ambitions. Therefore, political subjectivity is not 
tainted by moments of integration, individuality, and psychology. Rather, such 
moments have to be performed in order to articulate any kind of voluntarism. 
This voluntarism therefore is not naive, but highly fragile, offering only within 
12 Kleinians, e.g., are the most ardent critics of a scientific understanding of objective reality. 
You can still find that in Jacqueline Rose. And there is a fundamental lack of understand-
ing in terms of the symbolic formations; this was Lacan’s critique.
13 Paul Federn, “Das Ichgefühl im Traume”, in: Paul Federn, Ichpsychologie und die Psycho-
sen, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1978, pp. 53–83.
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its most precious and precarious moments the possibilities of distinction be-
tween phantasy and reality, utopia and trauma. Voluntarism has to invest in 
“traversing the phantasies”, one might say, in terms of their integrational, re-
flexive, and emotional capacities, capacities that are at the very core of any un-
derstanding of emancipation. Essentially, this voluntarism is based on a “will” 
directed less towards power and enjoyment than towards survival and to the en-
durance of the depressive conditions of its being. However, such a post-Kleinian 
approach has to be related to the category of the symbolic, i.e. the “topology” of 
the symbolic order, as I have tried to sketch it. Voluntarism can become political 
voluntarism only in relation to the symbolic category of politics. In this under-
standing, neither politics nor voluntarism appear as mere means to achieve cer-
tain goals, e.g. of otherness, authenticity, or equality; they always already rep-
resent these goals within different symbolic matrices (the matrix of politics and 
the matrix of the psyche). The invocations of the symbolic towards permanent 
change, alternatives, and otherness work in both matrices. They operate as two 
different sorts of phantasies, which allow these invocations to be both articulat-
ed and reflected. This perspective avoids either the imaginary identification of 
politics and voluntarism in the sense of a will to power or enjoyment or the strict 
separation of these categories. The symbolic, as I have here construed it, does 
not simply integrate all perspectives, but functions as a necessary precondition 
for the possibility of any qualification of thought. Neither politics nor volunta-
rism exhaust the symbolic as such. Doubtless, another turn against themselves 
might indeed be needed in order to further reflect, to mourn and to repair their 
own intrinsic transcendence. However, such a turn should not be understood in 
terms of political negativity, but only in terms of a more fundamental political 
negation of politics, and a volition turned towards the involuntary. Thus, a po-
litical voluntarism might appear in the categorical slippage from politics and vo-
lition alike. The uncontrollability of such an event could perhaps be conceived 
as an aesthetics of implosion, performing and reflecting the subversion of the 
symbolic invocations, while at the same time maintaining their emancipatory 
achievements.
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